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Abstract.Amidst the political and economic tensions that culminated inWorldWar II, the
Brazilian and Argentine states embarked within a few years of each other on signiþcant
reforms of their statistical services. In Brazil, the reform gave rise to a new and com-
pletely original statistical institution. Argentina, under the pressure of similar statistical
challenges, launched a number of failed reorganization attempts. The goal of this article
is to analyze and compare the restructuring of both statistical apparatuses. This paper
explores how the pillars of the ediþce of public statistics in each country were historically
constructed, in order to understand the basis of its social legitimacy and credibility.
Keywords. statistical apparatus, statistical reform, Argentina, Brazil, comparative study
Résumé. Reconstruire un appareil statistique d’État à un moment critique. Une
comparaison des cas argentin et brésilien, de la Grande Dépression à l’après-
Seconde Guerre mondiale. Dans le contexte de tensions politiques et économiques
qui a précédé la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les États brésilien et argentin ont engagé,
en l’espace de quelques années, des réformes importantes de leurs services statistiques.
Au Brésil, la réforme a donné lieu à une institution nouvelle et complètement originale.
Confrontée à des déþs statistiques similaires, l’Argentine a quant à elle vu échouer ses
nombreuses tentatives de réorganisation. L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser et de
comparer la restructuration des deux appareils statistiques. En revenant sur la façon dont
les institutions de la statistique publique se sont historiquement construites dans chacun
des deux pays, cet article cherche à mettre en lumière les fondements de leur légitimité
sociale et de leur crédibilité.
Mots-clés. appareil statistique, réforme de la statistique publique, Argentine, Brésil,
approche comparative
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Amidst the political and economic tensions that culminated in World
War II, the Brazilian and Argentine states embarked within a few years of
each other on signiþcant reforms of their statistical services. In the þrst
case, the reorganization went so deep that it gave rise to a new entity with
a completely original institutional physiognomy, which could not be easily
categorized within the parameters of the debates current at the time regarding
the forms of statistical organization. Argentina, however, under the pressure
of statistical challenges similar to those faced by its neighbor, in the early
1940s embarked on a series of failed intents for institutional change that,
instead, evidenced a certain impotence of the centralizing efforts of the state.
In both countries, the statistical reform constituted just one dimension within
a process of a more far-reaching reorganization of the state undertaken by
the populist regimes in power.1
The imperative to realize a statistical reform—which was already well
established in Brazil in the mid-1930s, though in Argentina it reachedmaturity
only in the following decade—emerged at a comparable juncture of economic
and political development in the two countries, characterized by a departure
from their traditional role in world trade as countries exporting only primary
products, the promotion of industrial development through import substitu-
tion oriented to the internal market that enriched their economic structure,
and a debate between the national governments and the social elites and the
established local powers. At the same time, the great inÿuence of the army
within national political life accompanied the difþculties these countries faced
in constructing (in Brazil) or reconstructing (in Argentina) a “democracy
for more complex and more diversiþed societies.”2 Within this particular
context, coordinating the task of producing ofþcial þgures and achieving
uniformity in the methodology as well as in the results turned into a speciþc
challenge that the national governments had to confront. The question is,
what solutions were deployed, within the range of available options, to treat
the same problem in the different countries? What were the consequences
of the restructuring conceived in terms of the institutional consolidation of
government statistics? What social and political conditions made it possible
for the statistical apparatuses to become established as legitimate authorities
of producing reliable data?
1. In this text I adopt a broad deþnition of populism as the singular political experience,
represented by the administrations of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1930–1945; 1951–1954)
and Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina (1946–1952; 1952–1955), that was characterized by
the thrust of an economic strategy promoting internal markets and a deliberate politics of
state-promoted industrialization of the country, which also implied giving an impulse to, or
broadening, social legislation and securing the popular masses’ access to social citizenship,
thus gaining their support. There is a vast literature on the phenomenon of populism available
in Latin America, where the debate about its exact nature continues.
2. F. DEVOTO & B. FAUSTO, 2008, p. 252.




The goal of this paper is to examine, from a comparative perspective,
the restructuring of the statistical apparatus carried out in Argentina and
Brazil between the decades of the 1930s and 1950s. For this purpose, we
put emphasis on the political, social as well as institutional factors that had
an impact on the greater or lesser consolidation of the changes promoted
in the two countries. As a hypothesis, we assume that the attention devoted
in Brazil to the political–conventional bases of statistical activity played in
favor of the perdurability of the statistical reform, while in Argentina the
tendency towards a unilateral imposition of a centralized model of public
statistics undermined its viability and ran into different obstacles. Brazilian
government statistics relied on internal and external sources of legitimation
that were disregarded in the Argentine case, such as a broad basis of social
allies and an active participation in inter-American statistical networks, which
helped strengthen the foundations of Brazil’s public statistics.
I wish to reÿect upon the relationship between the social credibility
enjoyed by public statistics and the historical trajectory of the confor-
mation of a statistical apparatus. At the same time, this article aspires to
make a contribution to a þeld of inquiries that has undergone considerable
expansion within the last 15 years, namely the socio-history of statistics in
Latin America. The historiography on this topic has not developed on a par
in Brazil and Argentina, and the published collective volumes reÿect this
disparity.3 Apart from the different institutional frameworks from which
this research emerged initially (the government statistics agency itself in
Brazil, as opposed to the academic þeld in Argentina), there are signiþcant
differences between the local historiographies that range from the conditions
and the breadth of their archives to the lines of research carried out, and the
extent and depth of the knowledge generated on the national experiences and
their gaps. While these differences affect the potentials of the comparative
enterprise, they do not invalidate it, as long as such differences are made
explicit and the researcher proceeds with caution in selecting the variables to
be analyzed and carries out cross-checks of his/her interpretations to make
up for those shortcomings.
Within academic circles where the social history of statistics ismore þrmly
established, such as the French and Anglo-Saxon traditions, the comparative
perspective arose in connection to the emergence of certain innovations in
statistics, such as the revolution of sampling.4 Other studies contrasted the
schema of the racial and ethnic classiþcation of the national censuses that bore
relation to the afþrmation of political and social identities.5 The long-term
reconstruction of the unfolding of statistical activity as part of the process of
the conformation ofmodernWestern states clearlymade possible a comparative
3. N. SENRA & A. CAMARGO, 2010; C. V. DE CARVALHO JUNIOR et al., 2011.
4. A. DESROSIÈRES, 2001.
5. J. SOUTHWORTH, 2001; D. KERTZER & D. AREL, 2002.
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approach between capitalist countries.6 These studies tended to differentiate
between the statistical trajectories of nations in the liberal–democratic tra-
dition (such as England and the United States) and those with a history of
strong states (such as France and Germany). The comparative perspective
was also used to study the debates concerning the modes of organization of
government statistics between the nineteenth century and the þrst half of the
twentienth century.7 This article speciþcally engages in a dialogue with these
last two lines of research, though it shifts the focus of institutional history and
the study of the debates between different models of statistical organization
to the speciþcities of the Latin American region.8
The þrst section of the article describes the dilemmas faced by Brazilian
and Argentine public statistics in the critical conjuncture of the pre-war
period. The second section lays out important social and political aspects of
the statistical restructuring implemented in the two countries, while the third
section introduces another factor, the institutional crises and the public debates
as instances that put to the test the steadiness and solidity of the government
statistical apparatus. Lastly, I will present certain conclusions.
1. Different Responses to the Same Problem
The challenges in common
By the 1930s, the difþculties Brazil and Argentina faced in terms of
their government statistics showed some similarities. In both countries, cer-
tain physical and demographic conditions—a vast territory with a dispersed
population with high levels of illiteracy as well as unevenly developed systems
of communication—had hindered the states’ efforts to complete the tasks of
compiling data and producing numbers since the nineteenth century. Other
difþculties were related to the tensions generated by the federal political regimes
in government statistical activities that required stable commitments between
6. S.WOOLF, 1989; A. DESROSIÈRES, 1996; L. SCHWEBER, 2006.
7. J.-P. BEAUD & J.-G. PRÉVOST, 1997; J.-G. PRÉVOST & J.-P. BEAUD, 2012.
8. All comparative enterprise implies a series of difþculties when the goal is to systema-
tically examine the same problem through two different national historical–social realities. The
possibility of formulating unfounded generalizations, recurring to misleading analogies, or
departing from models constructed a priori are some of the risks discussed by the available
literature (J. BARROS, 2007). We have proceeded with precaution in our methodology in the
face of the risks implied by the comparative approach, seeking to strengthen its virtues (its
capacity to transcend parochial perspectives and to highlight the singularities of one case with
respect to another) and recurring to a broad corpus of primary sources, in addition to relying
on secondary sources. The documental corpus is made up of ministry archives, norms (laws,
decrees, and resolutions), ofþcial periodical publications of the statistical agencies (journals,
bulletins, and annals), ofþcial reports, and periodic publications and the press.




statistical agencies of different administrative levels so as to guarantee the
uniformity of criteria and of actions at all steps of the statistical chain.9
In these countries, the critical conjuncture of 1930 revived the ques-
tion concerning the relationship between the central administration and the
regional powers, a political tension that had manifested in statistics-related
matters.10 The challenge to produce government statistics did not have to do
with a total lack of ofþcial statistical services, since both countries already
counted on such ofþces at different ministries, of a shorter or longer trajectory.11
Moreover, many of the political–administrative entities below the national
level (the provinces in Argentina and the federal states in Brazil) already had
their own organs of statistics. The problem consisted in the dispersion of the
state’s efforts to register and quantify, the lack of coordination between the
agencies already existing at different administrative levels, and the overlap
between ofþces of the same level (such as in the case of two ministries). At
the same time, within the framework of a discourse that demanded a certain
rationality of the public administration, these difþculties were conceived as
a problem of inefþcient use of public resources. These complications were
accompanied by other issues of a cognitive nature: the duplication of research,
difference of criteria and taxonomies, and diversity of procedures, which
9. Inspired by the North American model, the Argentine and Brazilian Constitutions
(1853 and 1891, respectively) consecrated federalism as a principle of political unity and
adopted a presidentialist system with a bicameral legislative power (senators and represen-
tatives elected in each federative unit). Despite the similarities between the institutional
models, dissimilar sociohistoric conditions brought about the conformation in Argentina of
a centralized republic with a strong federal executive power, while Brazil exhibited a power
more dispersed between the states and the Union. Brazil in general is considered an example
of multipolar or fragmented federalism (characterized by disputes for dominance among
various states), while Argentina is seen as a unipolar or concentrated federalism (with a single
undisputable center of power in Buenos Aires). In each case, the attributions retained by the
subnational states are key to understanding the different types of federalism: the subnational
states in Brazil retained broader margins of political and þnancial autonomy. Collecting cer-
tain taxes, for example, remained in the hands of the subnational states, while the Argentine
Constitution conferred this attribution on the central state. At the time, the Argentine natio-
nal government had a broad margin to intervene in the provinces, given that their military
power was suppressed, while in Brazil the states preserved their police power: some created
military forces capable of dissuading attempts at federal intervention. In addition, in Brazil
the federal regime recognized the authority of the subnational states to organize their own
administrative system. Although between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentienth the political system of both countries functioned through intra-oligarchic
pacts, Brazilian federalism strengthened the local state oligarchies and weakened the power
of the federal government.
10. In Brazil, the Estado Novo brought about the strengthening of the central power
to the detriment of the state powers, while, as is evident from the earlier comments, in 1930
Argentina had more fertile conditions and a more favorable tradition in terms of imposing
central power.
11. H. OTERO, 2006; C. DANIEL, 2011; H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014; N. SENRA, 2008;
N. SENRA & A. CAMARGO, 2010.
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resulted in divergent statistical results that were inconsistent with each other,
or even contradictory. The “shadows” cast on the validity of the statistical
results affected the social credibility of the ofþcial þgures and the legitimacy
of the government statistical machinery as a whole.
Even though the political revolution of 1930 in Brazil got in the way of
realizing the population census programmed for that year, the new govern-
ment took to the task of resolving the problems of coordination and lack of
uniformity that public statistics were suffering from. The former General
Administration of Statistics (Diretoria Geral de Estatística, DGE) had
experienced limitations in exercising its authority over other statistical depen-
dencies, given that the states and municipalities did not commit to following
their directives. The faulty access to administrative records in possession of
the different entities below the national level during the República Velha had
as a consequence that Brazilian statistics of that period were irregular, dis-
continuous, and lacked systematicity.12 The statistical restructuring consisted
in a series of political measures: the creation of the National Institute of
Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, INE) in 1934, the realization of
a National Convention on Statistics (Convención Nacional de Estatística)
in 1936 that would provide the basis of the National Council of Statistics
(Conselho Nacional de Estatística, CNE), and the creation of the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía y
Estatística, IBGE) in 1938, events that laid the foundation for the entire
ediþce of government statistics in Brazil. The National Council became the
key organ of the reform: it was a deliberative organ, composed of a General
Assembly, technical commissions, and an executive board, responsible for
orienting all statistical activities of the INE. Under the new regulations, the
CNE enjoyed full technical and administrative autonomy and subordinated
other statistical entities.
Around those years, the necessity of a statistical reform was becoming
more pressing in Argentina. The problems of coordination were þrst brought
up at the First National Meeting on Statistics (Primera Reunión Nacional de
Estadística) held in 1925. Although the lack of uniformity of the national,
provincial, and municipal statistics, along with the backwardness of some
of them, emerged as a drawback, in that speciþc context working towards
resolving those problems did not imply establishing new organizational
principles or setting up new structures. The technical recommendations
made at the meeting aimed, on the one hand, at avoiding overlaps, through
seeking a more efþcient distribution of the tasks and responsibilities among
the existing agencies, and, on the other hand, strengthening the coordinating
role of the General Administration of National Statistics (Dirección General
de Estadística Nacional, DGEN), as established by Law #3.180 on statistics,
12. N. SENRA, 2008.




sanctioned in 1894. The debate concerning the statistical organization arose
again at the beginning of the 1940s, given that different proposals were put
forth by state ofþcials working in public statistics, economists, and intellec-
tuals from the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the Universities of Buenos
Aires and the Littoral.13
Although the statistical reform was, above all, a national issue, the
discussion about the modes of organization of governmental statistics was
also well established at the international framework. The proposals varied as
to what level of centralized control should be required over the activities of
production and diffusion of ofþcial statistics. The diversity of the solutions
in practice in central countries, such as those proposed by Robert H. Coats in
Canada or Corrado Gini in Italy, was widely known. The discussion over the
principles of decentralization, coordination, or centralization found its way
into the meetings and the organs of communication of the global community
of statisticians, such as the International Statistical Institute (ISI) and the
journals of the statistical associations.14 Through these networks, the ideas
and the models of organization of government statistics migrated from one
country to another.15 That is, they constituted schemas that were available
both for Argentine and Brazilian statisticians. In fact, the latter ones appealed
to the terms of classiþcation of the types of organization of administrative
statistics established by the ISI, seeking to make the Brazilian reform þt into
one of those types, while they aimed at underlining, by contrast, the innovative
character of the reform that they were implementing in Brazil and the fact
that it was adapted to their national reality.16
Promoted, amidst the worldwide conÿagration, by the army generals that
seized power in 1943, the efforts towards implementing a statistical reform
in Argentina also dialogued with the restructuring of the national statistical
systems of developed capitalist countries that was implemented in close
connection with the war efforts and the growing state control over economic
activities. Given that the experience of the Brazilian statistical reform was
already beginning to show its þrst results, it appeared in the proposals of
Argentine specialists and politicians as one possible way forward, above all
owing to the fact that the Brazilian model was promoted by international
associations (such as the Inter-American Statistical Institute, IASI) as a
13. R. GARCÍA MATA, 1941; O. LESPIAUCQ, 1943; H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2007.
14. For more information on these debates and on the reforms of the national statis-
tical apparatuses from the nineteenth century through to World War II, see J.-G. PRÉVOST &
J.-P. BEAUD, 2012, p. 74–89.
15. J.-G. PRÉVOST & J.-P. BEAUD, 2012, p. 74.
16. H. PESSOA, 1940; O.MORAES, 1942.
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solution to the problem of statistical coordination in countries with a federal
political system.17
However, it would be rather hard to mechanically translate such models,
since the speciþc characteristics of the different national statistical traditions
are expected to have an impact on the course and results of the reforms
implemented. In Argentina, the efforts put into uniþcation tended towards
articulating the already existing resources (seeking to make compatible the
activities of the ofþces already in existence), while in Brazil the goal was to
establish and expand the network for collecting data, as well as to generate
local capacities (relying on a speciþc policy that targeted the statistical services
of the municipalities). In Argentina, the existence of already consolidated
ofþces within the ministries, with their own resources, capable of exerting
resistance against the centralizing efforts (on account of the possibility of
losing their prerogatives), had an impact on the results of the þrst attempts
at centralization.
Testing solutions: The stability of the innovations v. the provisional
character of the changes
Faced with the difþculties presented by the coordination of statistics, in
1938 Brazil completed setting up a new statistical ofþce, a sui generis structure
of federative scope that was based on the articulation and cooperation of the
three administrative levels of the political organization of the Republic. In
terms of its institutional design, the IBGE embodied a mixed model of nor-
mative centralization and executive decentralization: it had a central organ,
responsible for orienting all statistical activities, while it assumed a complete
decentralization in the execution of the tasks of recollecting information. The
IBGE, as head of the statistical apparatus, was in charge of coordinating the
tasks of the federal services of statistics (already in place at the ministries)
with the work of the statistical departments of the states and municipalities,
seeking to harmonize their statistical practices and unify their results.
The institutional innovation originated in a plan of reform designed
by Bahian lawyer Mário Augusto Teixeira de Freitas,18 a state ofþcial with
17. For evidence of this argument, see the references cited in the documents byW. LOPES,
1952, p. 124 and 127. The Brazilianmodel of organization received external backing at amoment
when international organizations were interested in making sure that federal agencies of sta-
tistics provided themwith a continuous supply of data. J. DUNCAN&W. SHELTON, 1978, p. 153.
18. Mário A. Teixeira de Freitas (1890–1956) entered the public administration at the
age of 18, through a formal job application process, as an intern at the General Administration
of Statistics of the Ministry of Roads and Public Works (Ministerio de Viação e Obras
Públicas). In 1911, he graduated as a lawyer from the Faculty of Law of Rio de Janeiro. In
1920, he became a delegate for the census of Minas Gerais. Later, he worked as head of the
Directorate of Information, Statistics and Diffusion (Diretoria de Informações, Estatística
e Divulgaçao) of the Ministry of Education and Public Statistics between 1931 and 1952. He




a background in public statistics, who additionally turned out to be an out-
standing intellectual who participated in the “space of intimacy” between
intellectuals and the political power generated by President Getúlio Vargas,
which constituted one of the fundamental differences between the populist
experiences in Brazil and Argentina.19 Freitas’s project of statistical reform
was based on the principle of interadministrative cooperation that had been
applied successfully in the terrain of education statistics.20 With the results
in evidence and drawing upon his direct ties with high political authorities
of the Estado Novo, Freitas obtained the political support necessary to
implement his proposal.
In Brazil, the integration of the already existing statistical services
was implemented through an intergovernmental pact sealed at the National
Convention on Statistics, by virtue of which the different political units made
a commitment that created ties between them and also with the system as
a whole. The statistical organs of the different spheres of the government
delegated responsibilities and decisions in statistical matters in a way that,
for those who agreed to subscribe to this schema, was compatible with the
federal system. This, however, was not quite clear for the states that offered
resistance, given that, in their understanding, the initiative was basically meant
to achieve centralization, and therefore was contrary to liberal constitutional
principles. The schema of the IBGE managed to endure on the basis of this
political agreement as the institutional authoritarianism of Vargas’s dicta-
torship proceeded in modifying the correlation of power between the states
and the (national) government of the Union. The “IBGEan model” conferred
a central role on the municipalities as spaces that housed the primary unit of
the system (the municipal agencies of statistics), which constituted a strategy
to circumvent the power matrix of the local state oligarchies in the terrain of
government statistics. They had come up with the formula for sustaining a
schema of decentralization that would not undermine the bases of the central
power of the state.
The broad autonomy bestowed on the National Council of Statistics
(Conselho Nacional de Estatística, CNE) created at the end of 1936 by the
statistical reform responded to the necessity to avoid the preponderant action
of the organs of the different spheres of government. In addition, the direct
ties of the CNEwith the Presidency were a testament to the statistical organ’s
great political signiþcance. The CNE had the responsibility of exercising
the highest level of orientation of statistical activities, deþning the criteria
to be adopted in the entire national territory. The challenge faced by the
was secretary general of the CNE between 1936 and 1948. He rose to the post of vice-president
of the International Institute of Statistics; N. SENRA, 2008, p. 507–558.
19. F. FIORUCCI, 2004.
20. For more information on the implementation of intergovernmental cooperation in
education statistics, see N. SENRA, 2014.
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CNE to bring uniformity to government statistics was such a huge task that
it required starting from establishing a common specialized terminology: it
was not simply a question of unifying methodologies, but also of establishing
a technical vocabulary shared by the actors of public statistics. At the same
time, organizing regular statistical campaigns and centrally deþning the
cadernos (data sheets or forms) served to systematize and standardize most
of the practices. For many of the issues that were systematically surveyed for
the þrst time in Brazil through the statistical campaigns (for example, agri-
cultural activities), the Argentine statistical apparatus already had established
procedures. For this reason, in Argentina, the uniform orientation was to be
imposed on statistical routines that had been in place for some time. However,
the schema of collaborative work that the Brazilian statistical campaigns
were based on respected the cognitive interests of the three administrative
levels: the nation, the states, and the municipalities. For this reason, Teixeira
de Freitas defended his model as one that was to achieve, simultaneously, an
“organic unity of its structure and a logical unity of an exact knowledge of
the actual reality of the Nation.”21
However, one of the þrst challenges the IBGE faced was to introduce the
statistical tasks into the administrative practices of the municipalities. Even
though the statistical system was based upon the ideal of joint intergovern-
mental action, the precariousness of the institutional framework of the local
statistical agencies presented the þrst obstacles to its functioning. Although
there had already existed statistical services in some municipalities before
the birth of the IBGE, the majority of them were created through the efforts
of this institution determined to cover such a vast territory.22 Nonetheless,
there was enormous disparity among the local agencies, with some of them
basically existing only on paper. Many municipalities lacked the appropriate
conditions for assuming responsibilities over data collection, given the scarcity
of their resources and the insufþcient skills of their personnel. The IBGE’s
efforts to strengthen the local statistical agencies grew into a political project
aimed at fomenting municipal life in general, which was embodied in the
campaign for the municipalities in the decade of the 1940s.23 However, soon
it led to the expansion of the attributions of the central organ over municipal
agencies (for example, the CNE intervened in the organization and the selec-
tion of personnel, in their training, as well as in deþning their remuneration
and the content of their tasks), thereby strengthening its control over those
agencies and generating more dependency.
21. M. TEIXEIRA DE FREITAS, 1940, p. 275.
22. The documental sources analyzed evidence a straight connection between the statis-
tical inquiries and the efforts put into constructing the national geographical space, given the
necessity to delimit and specify the territorial conþguration of Brazil. This characteristic is
not manifest in the work of Argentine statisticians. For more information, see E. PENHA, 1993.
23. The goal of consolidating the statistical tasks at the municipal level never appears
explicitly formulated in the Argentine regulations of the time relating to statistics.




The concentration of technical, administrative, and even þnancial
resources at the CNE led to a growing subordination of some of the organs
of the system. Although the statistical agencies at the federal level made only
a commitment to comply with the technical directives, as time passed, at the
other levels (states and municipalities) the subordination was extending to
questions related to administrative and þnancial issues, principally at times
when the statistical departments of the states or the statistical agencies of
the municipalities faced economic difþculties and it was up to the CNE to
ratify the distribution of þnancial help allocated to sustain those services. For
example, the CNEmanaged the spending of theCaixa Nacional de Estatística
Municipal, whose funds were collected through a tax on the entertainment
industry of each town. The Municipal Agreements on Statistics that were
signed beginning in 1942 and promoted speciþcally under the mandate of
Eurico Dutra (1946–1951) extended the conventional aspects of institutional
design to the primary units of the statistical system. However, its legitimacy
was to be undermined by doubts about whether the municipal agencies acted
on the basis of an autonomous commitment or under pressure, by the disputes
concerning how the data collection network was þnanced and, further ahead,
by the unilateral decision of somemunicipal authorities to withdraw from the
system, in several cases for political reasons. The demand for more municipal
and state autonomy strengthened in the aftermath of the promulgation in 1946
of the Constitution of the Republic, which did not uphold the principle of
intergovernmental cooperation that governed the IBGE.24
In Argentina in the 1940s, the statistical apparatus was permeated by
problems such as the lack of uniformity of the production of statistics and
the difþculties experienced in articulating the provincial agencies. However,
the need to carry out a national population census, following an extensive
30-year gap (given that the last census was conducted in 1914), impacted
in a particular way: those pressures stipulated the absolute and immediate
necessity of the measures that aimed at the administrative centralization of
statistical activities, promoted by the military government (1943–1946).25
Research has shown that the rise of authoritarianism or the imposition of
military regimes through coups d’état constitutes a political factor that might
contribute to steering national statistical systems towards centralization.26 The
24. N. SENRA, 2008, p. 110.
25. In comparative terms, one developmental paradox of Argentine statistical activities
that predated the reform efforts of the 1940s consisted in failing to fulþll the constitutional
mandate to take population censuses every 10 years, although the country had made pro-
gress in strengthening the state’s capacity to re-collect information with sectoral surveys
(industrial, mortgage loans, agricultural, educational), surpassing Brazil in this respect. In
the 1930s, new proposals for restructuring the national statistical service accompanied the
increasing number of requests for a demographical census that had been presented to the
National Congress since 1921.
26. J.-G. PRÉVOST & J.-P. BEAUD, 2012, p. 84.
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þrst statistical reform that the military regime attempted basically consisted
in renaming ofþces, reassigning personnel, and trying to reconþgure the ties
existing between long-standing statistical agencies. The reform was aimed
at reformulating the institutional structure that had consolidated towards the
end of the nineteenth century, with ofþces dispersed among ministries, and
which were independent from each other and only had very loose ties. The
Argentine statistical apparatus thus gave “the impression of an archipelago.”27
The modiþcations implemented were circumscribed to the central level of
government and, on the one hand, aimed at concentrating the staff of employees
and, on the other hand, at unifying procedures and methods. Although in
Brazil the process of reform implied the restructuring of the statistical services
at the different ministries, those changes did not constitute the core of the
reform. By contrast, the þrst statistical reorganizations in Argentina involved
merging certain preexisting organisms and attempting to subordinate them
to a single governing organ that was to supervise all statistical and census
activities. However, at different moments, the centralization set in motion
was to run into the obstacles created by some of the ofþces that still had
resources at their disposal that allowed them to resist the tutelage of a central
organ—whose legitimacy was as yet not quite evident—and permitted them
to devise alternative plans of action.28
On the other hand, in consonance with the Brazilianmodel, the Argentine
restructuring launched by the military government involved the creation of a
National Council of Statistics and Census (Consejo Nacional de Estadística
y Censos, CNEC), an autocratic body, just like in the neighboring country,
with the mission to establish common norms for statistical practices. In 1945,
the þrst president of the CNEC, JuanM. Vaccaro publicly demanded that the
provinces and the territories cooperate with the national organism.29 However,
this organism proved to be ephemeral (it functioned only between 1945 and
1946) as it passed through the hands of three different directors. Having failed
to fulþll the objective of carrying out the fourth national population census
and in the midst of accusations of administrative mismanagement, Vaccaro
was ousted by an auditor, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos A. Cattáneo, ex-director
of statistics of the army, who in turn was soon replaced by mathematician
Carlos E. Dieulefait. This pattern of instability contrasts sharply with the
case of the main referents of Brazilian statistics, who continued in their
posts from the mid-1930s through the beginning of the 1950s, transcending
the change of administration from Vargas to Dutra. In Argentina, during the
military government (1943–1946) as well as in the þrst years of Juan Domingo
27. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2011, p. 208.
28. Among these ofþces we must mention the Ofþce of Research on Economy of the
Central Bank, the statistical ofþces of the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce and those
of the Ministry of Agriculture.
29. República Argentina, 1945.




Perón’s presidency (1946–1955), the organ in charge of the coordination of
statistics failed to achieve stability, was relaunched several times through new
regulations, and was moved from the aegis of one ministry or secretariat to
that of others. The þrst initiatives aiming at military centralization sought
to unify criteria, without falling into a concentration of the executive tasks,
which incidentally coincided with the recommendation of some specialists.
However, as the administrative maladjustments persisted, the balance of the
later measures inclined towards an absolute executive and administrative
centralization, which in turn sparked internal critiques.30
TheNational Administration of Research, Statistics andCensus (Dirección
Nacional de Investigaciones, Estadística y Censos, DNIEC), the newly created
organ that inherited the prerogative of deþning norms and coordinating
statistical research was þnancially and administratively dependent on diffe-
rent ministries. This decision contrasted with the Brazilian experience which
showed that, on the one hand, the direct dependence on the Presidency (as
opposed to a single speciþc ministry) had bestowed on the CNE a legitimacy
of action over all spheres of politics, while, on the other hand, collecting
and administering their own þnancial resources had granted them a certain
degree of autonomy to act, although it implied some challenges as well. The
Argentine DNIEC hence renewed the ambition to control all the statistical
services in order to make up for the lack of unity of methods between them.
Under those circumstances, provincial statistics might have been useful for
local purposes, but not for the necessities of the national government. Under
the government of Perón, the uniþcation of criteria was presented as a way
to achieve increased efþciency and rationality within the national statistical
service. Politically pressing issues such as the design of a þve-year economic
plan helped impose (and justify) the high degree of concentration of statistical
information as the only viable option. However, in point of fact the þrst Peronist
planning preceded the moment when the government started in earnest with
its reform of national statistics.31 Once the political commitment to carry
out the national population census was fulþlled (in 1947), the government
took on the task of rearranging dynamic statistics, which was considered
to complement the census. In 1949, the call to attend a national Meeting on
Statistics in Buenos Aires, with exclusive participation of ofþcials within the
area of statistics of the different political–administrative levels of the country,
evidenced the pressing necessity to reach technical agreements. So much so
that, in his inaugural address, the Minister of Technical Matters Raúl Mendé
underlined the importance of speaking the same language in statistics and
putting an end to the disparity of criteria between the local governments and
30. The economist Carlos Correa Ávila, a former state functionary in industrial
statistics, criticized the “absolute centralization” and defended the mixed model of technical
centralization with executive decentralization. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2011, p. 211.
31. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2007. On planning, see P. BERROTARÁN, 2003.
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the national state. The meeting aimed to deþne strategies to coordinate statis-
tical research and reach certain uniformity in the methodology. The technical
decisions validated at the reunion had to be legitimated ad referendum later
through bilateral agreements of the respective local governments.
While Brazil established a schema of coordination in statistics that
was based on the negotiated acceptance of the parties involved, that is, it
was the result of voluntary agreements, the Argentine experience evidenced
a tendency towards the national executive branch trying to vertically and
unilaterally impose cooperation. The compulsory nature of the concentra-
tion of resources and authority exposed the reform to possible demands for
autonomy on behalf of the already existing statistical services. In 1951, the
Peronist government sanctioned a law (Law #14.046, which abolished the
legislative norms of Law #3.180 of 1894) in order to give a legal framework
to the new order of statistical and census activities. It created a new ofþce,
the General Administration of the National Statistical Service (Dirección
General del Servicio Estadístico Nacional, DGSEN), which was put in charge
of the orientation, systematization, and compilation of all statistics produced
in the country (with the sole exception of military statistics). All state ofþces
engaged in statistical work came to depend directly on the DGSEN and had
to adjust to the technical norms and guidelines issued by the central autho-
rity. It designated the executive branch as responsible for signing agreements
with the provinces and the municipalities in order to coordinate the technical
supervision and execution of statistical tasks. The þgures elaborated by the
provincial and municipal statistical services that did not subscribe to those
agreements would not be considered ofþcial statistics. In addition to merging
the responsibilities for the production and coordination of statistical data,
the new regulation attributed to the DGSEN the authority to oversee private
initiatives to produce statistical information. The reform was actually closer
in spirit to a conception of statistics as a service to the local branches of
government than to the idea of a system.
Just like in the warring countries, the global situation of war necessi-
tated certain modiþcations in the national statistical services both in Brazil,
a country that intervened in the situation from the þeld of the antifascist
movement, and in Argentina, which declared its support for the Allies near
the end of the conÿict, which meant losing out on the þnancial and military
advantages that Brazil received later as a supporter of the United States. In
terms of international politics, the two countries were transiting different
paths: the Brazilian politics of alliance with the United States contrasted
with the traditional Argentine antagonism towards North American positions.
During the war, questions relating to national security exerted additional
pressure on the production of reliable statistics in matters that were directly
related to the war effort. In both countries, the regulations passed between the
1940s and the early 1950s reserved special treatment for military statistics




and ensured that those compilations remained under strict military control.
While the strategic military view of statistics in terms of protecting national
security was pivotal in Argentina, so much so that between 1946 and 1948
all statistical ofþces of the state were brought under the aegis of the Council
of National Defense, in Brazil the country’s participation in the conÿict
lent a certain urgency to the goal of removing the existing obstacles to the
functioning of the data collection system, in order to rapidly systematize and
regularize the statistical inventories all around the country. It was at that time
that the IBGE proceeded to establish the responsibilities for organizing and
maintaining the municipal statistical services.
At the same time, the context of war imposed certain restrictions on the
public circulation of statistical information both in Argentina and in Brazil.
The war was, on another level, an economic conÿict. Handing opponents
the statistical þgures pertaining to the wealth and economic resources of
the country became equivalent to giving a strategic advantage to the enemy.
For this reason, the þgures became, for some time, quasi-military secrets.
The diffusion of ofþcial statistics was normalized in Brazil before it would
occur in Argentina, where the task of overseeing the publication of data
remained in effect until 1950 on grounds of national defense, even though it
was difþcult to ensure that the provincial ofþces complied with the restrictive
measures they deþed.
2. Bases of Support and Sources of Legitimation
of Public Statistics
Statistics and political projects
In both countries, the initiatives aimed at reforming statistics gained
the political support of charismatic leaders such as Vargas and Perón. The
populist regimes introduced a new conception of the political organization of
society and they broadened the scope of the aspects of economic and social
life placed under state regulation. The production of statistics obtained poli-
tical relevance as technical input of the new social engineering deployed by
the state. In addition, statistics were incorporated into the political rhetorics
on the modernization of the state and rational planning.
In comparative terms, from the very beginning in Brazil there prevailed
the conviction that statistical uniþcation was an inherently political action,
both in terms of its origins and its projected horizon. In the þrst place, as
to its political bases, the new institution (the IBGE) emerged from conven-
tional ties between autonomous political entities. The subordination to a
central entity was justiþed as a solidary mechanism of all the elements that
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composed a statistical system; the unity of the results appeared as the fruit
of the convergence of voluntary efforts.
In the second place, another political dimension of the Brazilian statistical
reform lay in the fact that it formed part of a process of political–administrative
uniþcation and state rationalization. In fact, the IBGEembodied the transforming
spirit of the public administration that had characterized theEstado Novo since
Vargas had embarked on raising its standards through creating a professional
body of public servants and establishing a formal application process and career
plans for staff, despite limited results.32 In the area of statistics, the principle of
interadministrative cooperation expressed the organic conception of the state
that guided Vargas’s project to revitalize the state apparatus.33
On the other hand, the IBGE was integrated into Vargas’s political pro-
ject to refound the nation through deþning a “civic system of ideas” for the
institution.34 Not only did this body of ideas assign the IBGE a cultural role
in society—entrusting it with the promotion of a nationalist ideology—but it
also made the institute an active participant in the social transformation of the
country, through elaborating studies and working out proposals on the basis
of statistical knowledge.35 Knowledge about the population and the territory
was to form the base for the politics of social reform and for the economic
development of the country, the colonization of the interior, and the settling
down and recognition of the rural worker, which all formed part of the job
of national integration projected by Vargas.36
The statistical reform of the þrst Peronist government shared with the
IBGEan body of ideas an appreciation of statistics as a source of technical
solutions to national problems and instated it as the foundation of government
planning. Another common feature was the negation of the liberal experience
that Peronism held responsible for the statistical fragmentation that reigned in
Argentina. For referents of the Peronist government, the tight bond between
aspects of the social, economic, and administrative life of the country called
for integrated and uniþed statistics. In the statistical realm, the disparity of
criteria put national unity at risk. The centralized control over statistics that
the government aimed at was justiþed as the way to put national interest
above the interests of individuals. It sought to make government statistics
into a rational tool of forecasting of the state, which would transcend speciþc
occasional necessities for information. Even though the Peronist government
found in statistical information a pillar for its political project of distributive
justice, it circumscribed the tasks of the statistical bureaucracy to its routines
32. K. SIKKINK, 1993.
33. E. PENHA, 1993.
34. A. CAMARGO, 2008.
35. M. TEIXEIRA DE FREITAS, 1945.
36. A. CAMARGO, 2008, p. 383.




of registering and quantiþcation. By contrast, the institutional design of the
IBGE, the degree of autonomy that the CNE maintained, as well as the very
proþle of its principle referents allowed the IBGE to host political proposals
that went beyond strictly statistical objectives.37
Lastly, the statistical renovation in Brazil was not limited to the tech-
nical aspects of the activity, as appears to have been the case in Argentina ;
rather it had as its complementary goal to construct a sense of community: to
create the “IBGE family.” The purpose of engendering an identity shared by
those participating in the production of statistics was consistent with Vargas’s
intentions to foment a public spirit and to consolidate a civic awareness in state
bureaucracy in general. The instauration in 1942 of the celebration of the “Day
of the Statistician,” for example, formed part of a series of initiatives related
to creating the institution’s own collective mystique, since it was considered
just as fundamental to form agents who were well prepared for carrying out
their tasks as it was to shape the disposition of those agents by virtue of a
speciþc ethos.38 Although doubts persist regarding the actual results of the
training initiatives of the IBGE (in terms of its impact on raising the skill
levels of the statistical bureaucracy), from the perspective of creating and
reproducing an institutional culture, a sense of belonging and an identity of
the IBGE, its achievements could not be overlooked.
The social foundation of public statistics
One signiþcant difference between the Brazilian andArgentine statistical
reforms lies in the degree of openness towards the participation of non-go-
vernmental actors in the processes of technical production and validation of
ofþcial þgures. The reconstruction of the ediþce of government statistics in
Brazil originated in a broad call to all those interested in collaborating with
the mission of raising the standards of the country’s statistics. Even though
he was of the opinion that the state had more resources at its disposal and
enjoyed authority to carry out statistical research, the ideologue of the IBGE,
Teixeira de Freitas did not consider the state as the only competent actor in
the matter, and valued the parallel and complementary efforts represented
by the initiatives of statistical production on behalf of associations of civil
society and private entities (that were few at the beginning, but tended to
multiply in later decades).39 In this way, the institutional schema of the IBGE
contemplated the integration of “afþliated institutions” into the national statis-
tical apparatus. This opened up channels for the participation of university
37. The organization of councils was a format not unfamiliar to the Peronist state.
However, local historiography has tended to point out that, in spite of its formal attributions, the
decisions normally remained concentrated in the sphere of the executive power. D. CAMPIONE,
2007; P. BERROTARÁN, 2003.
38. R. PERSSINOTTO, 2014.
39. M. TEIXEIRA DE FREITAS & J. LARA, 1945.
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research centers, trade unions, associations representing businessmen’s
interests, private foundations, institutions, and statistical departments of
banks as well as other public entities, such as the stock market, in the destiny
of public statistics. Their representatives offered specialized collaboration
and intervened in the deliberative spaces of the CNE and its technical com-
missions; they were even recognized as producers of ofþcial þgures (such
as the Foundation Getúlio Vargas, with its calculation of national income
and its measurement of the Consumer Price Index, or CPI). Nothing similar
was to be found in the Argentine experience; there was absolutely no sign of
any vocation to integrate or capitalize on paragovernmental initiative (but
instead a move to watch over the diffusion of their results, as envisaged by
the law on statistics passed in 1951).
In Brazil, integrating multiple social actors in the reform expanded the
social base of support for ofþcial statistics. During theEstado Novo, the degree
of openness of the statistical system was consistent with Vargas’s intention
to build up a corporative structure that would allow for the representation of
speciþc socioeconomic interests within the state, without the mediation of the
parties,40 and with his political strategy of permanent negotiations.41 Later on,
this characteristic of the system proved to be useful for obtaining social recogni-
tion and establishing authority once the country’s political–institutional life
was normalized after 1945.Within the realm of public statistics, the alliances
forged with other social actors turned out to be essential for constructing the
social legitimacy of the activity and conþdence in its institution, but also for
its perdurability.
As has been pointed out in the literature, legitimacy and credibility are
fundamental values for any public agency of statistics.42 One of the sources
of the credibility of ofþcial þgures resides in the fact that they are produced
by people and institutions with a socially recognized, outstanding scientiþc
and technical proþle. As the collegiate organ of the apparatus, formed by
several commissions and a body of technical advisers, the Brazilian CNE
contributed to building this reputation for the statistics produced in the
country. The body of advisers that provided the basis of its decisions was
made up of representatives of economic, social, and cultural institutions,
as well as specialists in statistics and university professors.43 This speciþc
40. M. PLOTKIN, 2006, p. 485.
41. F.WEFFORT, 1999, p. 145.
42. A. DESROSIÈRES, 1996; S. SCHWARTZMAN, 1997.
43. In Brazil, the integration of the þgure of the technical adviser in the composition
of the CNE generated channels of interchange between the agencies of public statistics and
the university. Many of the advisers were university professors active in the þeld of ofþcial
statistics, collaborating as consultants in the elaboration of questionnaires, imparting knowledge
through their interventions in the debates or through publishing their reÿections in the Revista
Brasileira de Estatística, edited by the IBGE in collaboration with the Brazilian Society of
Statistics. The articles published there were presented as “a prolongation in the scientiþc and




composition of the deliberative organ of the Brazilian statistical apparatus
implied a degree of proximity and interrelation between government statistics
and the academic þeld of statistics that was rare in the Argentine case, at least
between the second half of the 1940s and the late 1960s.
Thus, the Brazilian CNE held general assemblies (a tradition that was
upheld even in times of crisis), showing an internal capacity of deliberation
on the part of the statistical apparatus that was absent in the Argentine case.
The dynamics of constructing technical agreements was based on regular
meetings at which the different representatives of the organs that comprised
the apparatus debated and adopted resolutions, through majority vote. These
had the force of law for the collective entity. Far from the tight hermeticism
that characterized the decision-making and elaboration of criteria for the
uniformization of Argentine statistics—evidenced, for example, by the secrecy
surrounding the Meeting on Statistics in 1949—the CNE assemblies were
open to the public. We know that no statistical uniþcation proceeds without
tensions, since in such processes the question of who actually deþnes the
patterns and who controls the production and validation of the data itself
comes into play. For this reason it is important that the decisions be seen as
invested with legitimacy. By contrast, the Argentine case shows that the brief
experience of the functioning of a Council on Statistics was hegemonized by
military functionaries and high-level bureaucrats, thus betraying the idea of
those who originally fomented it.44 The scarce representation of university
professors, research specialists, and members of societies related to statistics
raised critiques. The discontented voices sought to create a central governing
organ whose composition would give it more representation and relative
power to specialists.
With the endorsement of transnational organizations
“Brazilian statistics was born, expanded and were consolidated under
the simultaneous auspices of two deþning ways of thinking, which outlined
social field of the activities of the CNE” (M. TEIXEIRA DE FREITAS, 1946, p. 523). The sources
seem to indicate that the porosity between the worlds of administrative and scholarly statistics
was much less pronounced in the Argentine case.
44. The proposal by Professor Julio Acerboni, as adviser of the Senate of the Nation
in 1934, included the creation of a permanent collegiate commission that would guarantee
the coordination of the production of official figures (H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014, p. 177).
Professor Dieulefait—director of the Institute of Statistics of the National University of the
Litoral—called for the intervention of expert advisers in all phases of the statistical procedure
(E. DIEULEFAIT, 1938, p. 274). In the early 1940s, Rafael García Mata publicly defended the
idea of articulating the statistical work of the ofþces through a central advising and coordi-
nating organization, comprising qualified experts (R. GARCÍA MATA, 1941). Oscar Lespiaucq
suggested the creation of a collegiate body on statistics integrated by representatives of
the federal statistical departments and those of provincial and municipal statistical ofþces
(O. LESPIAUCQ, 1943, p. 255).
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its course. While one was that of national renovation, the other was bent on
international cooperation.”45 These words, pronounced in 1955 by Teixeira
de Freitas at the Brazilian Society of Statistics (Sociedade Brasileira de
Estatística), allow us to introduce the question of to what degree international
orientation formed part, for the IBGE, of the institutional politics deþned,
revealing evenmore differences compared to the Argentine case. The mission
of bringing Brazilian statistics closer to the international understanding of the
specialty was one of its foundational goals. The internationalist standpoint
was also evidenced by the publishing politics of its ofþcial organ of diffusion,
the Revista Brasileira de Estatística, which contained speciþc news sections
on the development of worldwide statistics, and disseminated international
nomenclature, methods used in other countries, and the resolutions of inter-
national conferences. This journal even dedicated some of its editorial pieces
to themes such as the international comparability of statistics.
Although we could not detect a similar inclination in Argentine statis-
tics, this fact does not imply a total isolation from the circles and initiatives
of statistical cooperation at the continental or even global level, a tendency
that gained strength after World War II. The creation in 1940 of the IASI
and the initiative for realizing a Census of the Americas (Censo de las
Américas) expressed this effort for institutionalization and the strengthening
of the ties between statisticians in the region. The inauguration of the Inter-
American Statistical Training Center (Centro Interamericano de Enseñanza
de Estadística, CIENES) at the very beginning of the 1950s, under the
auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), demonstrates that
these inter-American relations were consolidated enough to support a trai-
ning project at the regional scale, which responded to a preoccupation of the
IASI concerning the professional proþle and the skill levels of the staff of
government statistics in Latin American countries.
If we look at the ties between the Brazilian or Argentine agencies
and transnational organisms, their participations at international events, in
initiatives for statistical coordination, or in regional circuits of training, in
all of those aspects the former country appears as a steadier, more active,
and more inÿuential participant than the latter. Although both countries had
representatives, certain key personalities from Brazil were the ones who, at
key moments, lead the destiny of the regional institutions. Teixeira de Freitas,
secretary general of the IBGE, was president of the þrst executive board of
the IASI. His election is politically signiþcant, since he displaced from this
position the representatives of the United States, the country with the stron-
gest tradition in statistics and censuses and the most economic and political
weight in the continent. Moreover, Teixeira de Freitas was the only Latin
American representative on the board on statistics of the United Nations at
45. Asamblea General, 1955.




the moment it started its activities as an advisory body in 1946. In addition,
Tulio Hostilio Montenegro (former director of the technical division of the
National Service of Census, the Servicio Nacional de Recenseamento) was
elected to direct the recently founded CIENES.
On the other hand, Brazilian statisticians seem to have had þrmer
pan-American aspirations than their Argentine counterparts. The Brazilian
CNE showed a strong commitment towards the circles of meeting and exchange
among statisticians of the region and had an active role in stimulating and
maintaining scientiþc cooperation in the area of statistics on the continent
(even in þnancial terms, given that in 1948 it gave its institutional backing
to raising the membership dues of IASI countries). With small delegations
at the Inter-American Congresses on Statistics and an intermittent presence,
Argentina went through periods of “silence” on these transnational scenes, such
as between 1949 and 1951, and it got somewhat marginalized in continentwide
initiatives, such as the Census of the Americas (1950). Given that Argentina
had carried out its population census in 1947, the country’s participation in
the reunions and discussions about setting the criteria, as well as its impact
on the resolutions adopted by the organizing committee, was scarce.
Lastly, we must point out differences in the participation of these coun-
tries in the regional networks of training in statistics that were forming in
those years. During 1940, the training of statisticians became a problematic
issue not just because of the poor skills of the employees in public statis-
tics, but also because the þeld of application of this expert knowledge was
undergoing rapid expansion (towards the industrial world, market analysis,
psychology, electoral forecasts, etc.), which called for training in technical
competence and professional specialization. This was the understanding
of the members of the IASI that created a speciþc commission to treat the
matter of teaching statistics, with the aim of preparing recommendations for
curricula to member countries. The commission was presided by a specialist
from Rosario, mathematician Carlos Dieulefait, who had brieÿy worked for
the Argentine apparatus of public statistics and was rather more established
in the þeld of academic statistics;46 on the commission he was accompanied
by Professors Kingston and Da Silva Rodrigues of the Universities of Rio de
Janeiro and São Pablo respectively. However, neither the presence of a þgure
like Dieulefait nor his fundamental contribution to organizing the teaching
of the discipline was an expression of a commitment on the part of Argentine
governmental statistics to the regional associations or to the strengthening
of inter-American relations.
On the other hand, it appears that Argentines took relatively less advan-
tage of the regional circuits of training than Brazilians. During the 1940s,
the government of the United States sponsored the specialization of Latin
46. C. DANIEL, 2012.
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American technical staff in the sector of statistics through attending spe-
cial or regular courses or visiting universities and research centers. Of the
260 Latin American technicians that participated in this circuit of training
between 1942 and 1950, only 5 were from Argentina (a number that was
smaller than for any other country in the region, except Honduras). The scarce
participation was consistent with the Argentine attitude, opposed to the rise
of the inÿuence of its North American neighbor over the statistical organisms
of the different states in the continent. Brazil, on the other hand, was able
to train 16 technicians within this program.47 Even so, the local specialists
were of the opinion that the IBGE could not take enough advantage of the
opportunities of cooperation and the existing fellowships.48 Even though it
is true that Argentina had already had, for some time, spaces for teaching
statistics at universities, given that the þrst university degree in statistics in
Latin America was created in that country,49 the IBGEwas particularly active
in generating proposals on training for its employees: it created the þrst school
in statistics (Escola Nacional de Ciências Estatísticas, ENCE), which was
molded according to its training interests, although the level of hiring of its
graduates by the government statistical apparatus was low.
In general terms, the intervention in the international context consisted
in an opportunity (whether exploited or not) to recruit allies to reach a certain
position in international statistics, but above all to legitimize government
statistics in the local context at times when the mechanisms for the technical
validation of the statistical practices and the legitimation of the norms of
government statistics were undergoing a reconþguration.
3. Weathering the Crises, Strengthening the Foundations
At the beginning of the 1950s, the Brazilian public statistical apparatus
went through a crisis that had no local precedent, nor was there any parallel
in the Argentine experience. We would like to describe this crisis brieÿy
since we understand that getting through internal debates in fact shows the
degree of consolidation of an institution in statistics. The crisis began with the
public declarations of the then president of the IBGE, General Polli Coelho,
which provoked the response of technicians of the General Assembly of the
CNE, backed by Teixeira de Freitas, sparking a controversy. The very pos-
sibility of a public debate about statistics suggests a certain strength of the
institution that puts its social prestige and authority at risk. At the same time,
surviving those blows shows the capacity of endurance of the assemblage of
47. “Especializacao de técnicos latino-americanos nos Estados Unidos,” 1950.
48. T.MONTENEGRO, 1964, p. 24.
49. For more information on teaching the discipline of statistics in Argentina and in
Brazil, see R.MENTZ & V. YOHAI, 1991; J. PEREIRA & P.MORETTIN, 1991.




actors, technical instruments, norms, and practices that make up the public
statistics of a country. The solidity of the apparatus constructed is a result of
the effective integration of the statistical ofþces into broader networks, both
scientiþc and administrative and political, which contributed to generating
and maintaining its social authority.
At the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952, the critiques of General
Coelho—who was in favor of a radical reform of the Brazilian statistical
apparatus—had great impact because they focused on points that touched
a nerve with public opinion such as the high costs and the lack of updates
in ofþcial statistics, beyond casting doubt on their precision. In fact, the
controversy evidences a crisis of multiple dimensions: it involved þnancial
and structural issues in relation to the IBGE, as well as questions relating to
the content of statistical activities that had, up to then, been deþned by the
technicians through consensus (the division of tasks, the primary interests
of research, the techniques to be used, etc.).50 The internal conÿict showed,
for the þrst time, the tumbling of certain fundamental principles that the
institution rested on. In the þrst place, it called into question the legitimate
þeld of competence of the IGBE. The critiques reproached the institution
and its supervising organs for having strayed from questions that were consi-
dered “appropriate” for the statistical task; they questioned their direct ties
with a politically motivated project, seeking to deþne once more the limits
between statistics, as a technical activity, and the programmatic goals of a
government. In second place, they denounced the research agenda in statistics
as anachronistic and out of touch with national reality. They questioned the
criteria for establishing the priorities of the statistical program, which ones
had to be considered basic statistics and which ones were to be relegated as
secondary. The IBGE was questioned for the broad range of issues covered
by its statistical campaigns, given that the design of its instruments for data
collection had to respond to the statistical interests of the three levels of
government. On the contrary, they suggested that a new statistical program
needed to be deþned from the center, independently of the informational
needs of the municipal and regional governments. In this way, the internal
conÿict actually put at risk the founding principles of the statistical system:
interadministrative cooperation and statistical agreements. This represented
the political limits of the critique given the very real possibility that the IBGE
would lose its political and social allies, who had proven to be necessary for
sustaining the national statistical apparatus.
With the question of the continuity of the statistical apparatus established in
the 1930s, as decided by a commission set up by President Vargas (1951–1954),
now resolved, the 1951–1952 crisis had immediate consequences as well as
longer-term repercussions. At the administrative level, it led to a reorganization
50. For more information on the crisis, see N. SENRA, 2008, p. 413–486.
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of the General Secretariat of the CNE and brought about an exodus of per-
sonnel. In parallel with the challenges to the organizational principles and the
growing distrust towards its statistical production, the þnancial problems were
becoming more pressing due to falling revenues from the so-called “statis-
tics tax” (taxa de estatística). Similarly, the creation of the National School
of Statistical Sciences (Escola Nacional de Ciências Estatísticas) has been
linked in the research literature to this crisis, as a response to the demand to
raise the level of preparation of the personnel working in government statis-
tics.51 However, there are two issues that surface in the long term, producing
changes or introducing new orientations in the apparatus: (1) the emergence
of projects for administrative reform, which generated opposition among the
technicians at the IBGE in 1952, but gained supporters as time passed; and
(2) the continuous review of statistical campaigns as a priority goal of the
institution, including the designation of special commissions.
By contrast, in Argentina the crisis was not conþned to the organ of
statistics; rather, it affected the Peronist state in its totality. In 1955, just four
years after sanctioning the latest norms regulating public statistics, a new
coup d’état introduced modiþcations in government statistics, as part of the
project carried out by the military personnel participating in the coup to
“deperonize” the state: it renamed the central organism of public statistics
(Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos) as well as its ofþcial organ
of diffusion (Boletín Mensual de Estadística), and transferred it back to the
aegis of the Ministry of Finance for administrative and budgetary control.
Even though the change of government activated, once more, the pattern of
high turnover of public employees that was characteristic of the Argentine
state,52 after the brief mandate of scholar José Barral Souto, the direction
of public statistics would be placed in the hands of career state employees
(between 1956 and 1969). In terms of statistical practices, Peronism had left
established a major part of the routines for elaborating statistics that would be
maintained after its overthrow and in spite of the instability of the political
regime, due to the succession of civil and military governments between
1960 and 1980. It appears that, from 1955 on, the Central Ofþce of Statistics
acquired a certain inertial dynamic, given the continuity of its work routines
(based on the compilation of censuses and the update of permanent statistics)
and the persistence of the priorities set in its research agenda. In the face of
such a conservative inclination, in the sense of maintaining the status quo,
the innovating stimulus—that is, an effort to transform the practices, tech-
niques, and the aspects of reality objectiþed by the numbers—would emerge
from other state agencies. Nonetheless, some overlaps and incongruities in
the elaboration of ofþcial statistics would persist. Critiques concerning the
backwardness of the statistical publications, the weakness of their estimations,
51. N. SENRA, 2014.
52. K. SIKKINK, 1993.




and the general quality of their production were promptly formulated by a
state elite in favor of modernization, who worked at the recently created
developmentalist organisms of the state. In the mid-1960s, there was a certain
consensus regarding the urgency of embarking on a new integral restructuring
and regulation of the national statistical service.
4. End of the Institutional Cycle and Final Balance
It is evident that the second half of the 1960s opened a new era of insti-
tutional life for public statistics in Brazil and Argentina. With a difference of
just one year, both countries embarked on administrative reforms represented
by the creation of the IBGE Foundation in 1967 and the National Institute for
Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, INDEC)
in 1968. They also transferred their central organs of statistics to the sphere
of government planning agencies: the Ministry of Planning (Brazil) and the
National Committee on Development (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo,
Argentina). The latter country incorporated into the statistical norms the
principles of centralized direction and decentralized execution that had been
in practice in Brazil since the 1930s; government statistics was þnally seen
as a system and it posed the problem of technical and economic assistance
to the peripheral statistical organs. As for the IBGE Foundation, although it
concentrated more responsibilities for the production of statistics, it enjoyed
autonomy in administrative and þnancial issues, characteristics that were
conspicuously absent from the law decree that created the INDEC (#17.622).53
In the words of Simon Schwartzman, even though it is doubtful to what degree
the data produced by the IBGEwere used systematically by the governments
for the purposes of long-term planning, the very imaginary of planning
placed the legitimacy of the statistical organ on a new foundation.54 A similar
observation can be made about the Argentine case as well.
The comparison laid out here is relevant in at least two aspects. With
respect to the processes of the conformation of the state, the research litera-
ture in general coincides in underlining the more pronounced “density” of
the Brazilian state as opposed to the Argentine one.55 This article provides
arguments for this thesis by examining the conþguration of one of its speciþc
technical bureaucracies. Cases like these represent part of an explanation of
“the density of the state” and not the other way around; that is, it is not viable
to assume the preexistence of this characteristic to explain the consolidation
53. At present, this law is still in force, and the question of the autonomy of the INDEC
still continues as a matter of public controversy and draws criticism from specialists. See
S. TORRADO, 2007.
54. S. SCHWARTZMAN, 1997.
55. G. O’DONNELL, 1984.
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of a service of public statistics. In the second place, in relation to the confor-
mation of the statistical apparatus, the contrast between these two national
experiences allows us to draw attention to the distance that exists between
implementing a technical reform (or an administrative centralization) and
constructing a scientiþc–political network to sustain the legitimacy and
credibility of a statistical apparatus on the long run. In any case, we still
need comparative studies to incorporate other dimensions and further our
understanding of the social and political processes that lead to consolidating
the social authority of public statistics in different countries.
The comparison between the two cases under scrutiny showed that the
“IBGEan model” encouraged cooperation and executive decentralization,
while the Argentine politics of forced concentration of statistical tasks led to
merging responsibilities for production and coordination in a single central
organ. The series of institutional changes in Argentine public statistics could
be interpreted as a manifestation of the difþculties of resolving the statistical
challenges of the post-war period. In light of this study, those failed attempts
at centralization emerge as a contrast to the dynamics of technical agreements
and political accords that became—though not free of tensions—a source of
the stability of institutional innovation in Brazil.
Integrating a transnational dimension into the comparison not only
shows the effects that the worldwide turmoil brought for the statistical appa-
ratuses of peripheral states, it also evidences the fact that the inter-American
connections created a scenario of external legitimation for national public
statistics and opened up a channel of professionalization for its staff of public
employees, exploited—better or worse—by the countries under scrutiny.
Unlike Argentine administrative statistics, less connected to the transnational
networks, the pan-Americanist aspirations of Brazilian statisticians and their
active intervention in those circuits favored the consolidation of Brazil’s
statistical apparatus.
On the other hand, the creation of the IBGE formed part of an integral
long-term project to reform the public administration and to modernize the
state, which was not the case for Argentina. The IBGE was integrated into
the guidelines of a broader political program, which transcended Vargas’s
government, and which entrusted the institution both with a technical task
and a political–cultural mission. This mission contributed to the fact that the
research agenda was principally oriented towards social and cultural issues, to
the detriment of economic variables, at least until it gained a new orientation in
the 1960s. At that time, the depth of the economical–structural transformation
of the country—a product of the development strategies implemented by the
different governments, beginning with Vargas’s administration56—created a
56. On the contrary, Argentina lacked such continuity in the implementation of such
governmental development strategies. M. PLOTKIN, 2006; K. SIKKINK, 1993.




demand among industrial associations, professional economists, and govern-
ment planners for data on economic issues.57 This way, with the reform of
the network for data collection, local issues lost their predominance in favor
of national and regional interests. Thus, the municipalist approach, which
represented an important difference between the Brazilian and the Argentine
case, was gradually relegated to the background.
Beyond the speciþcity of the different national political moments that
provided the contexts of opportunity for driving those changes, the fact that
the statistical reform in Brazil happened earlier than in Argentina did not
play a central role in our interpretations. Nonetheless, our understanding is
that the relative celerity of the consolidation of the Brazilian statistical appa-
ratus, just like the international prestige it earned in a relatively short period,
reafþrms the role of the density of scientiþc–political networks of support
(the importance of having internal and external allies) in the consolidation
of statistical systems, as we suggested in our hypothesis.
The IBGEan model encompassed a broad spectrum of social, political,
and technical actors who were integrated into its institutional life, while the
central organ of Argentine statistics increasingly resembled a socially isolated
bureaucratic niche, but one paradoxically permeable to the vicissitudes of the
political situation. During the process of institutionalization, broadening the
social bases of the ediþce of public statistics allowed Brazil to strengthen the
legitimacy of statistical activity and, at the same time, it provided institutional
strength. In the medium term, this opening generated differential conditions,
with respect to Argentina, for the implementation of the new paradigm that
was introduced in the Latin American region in the 1960s, according to
which the necessities and data demands of users (of the different areas of the
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